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International Influences in Transition Societies: The Effect of UNHCR and other IOs on 
Citizenship Policies in Ukraine1 
 
Oxana Shevel2 
 
I.   Preface 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of international organizations on Ukrainian citizenship policies in 
the post-1991 period.   As over 250,000 Crimean Tatars repatriated to Ukraine in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s after being forcefully deported in 1944, some 100,000 of thm found themselves 
without Ukrainian citizenship, of which some 25,000 were stateless.   The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations have been working 
with the Ukrainian government to facilitate access to Ukrainian citizenship for these formerly 
deported people (FDPs).    
 
The paper provides an overview of UNHCR’s and other international organizations’ (IOs’) 
activities aimed at bringing about changes in Ukrainian citizenship policy and facilitating access of 
FDPs to Ukrainian citizenship.  In examining IOs’ effectiveness, the paper distinguishes among 
three types of IOs’ effects: their effect on domestic policy formation regarding different elements 
of citizenship policy; on interpretation of different legal provisions by central and local-level 
authorities; and on policy implementation.  The paper seeks to specify under what conditions and 
through what mechanisms IOs influence domestic policy in each of the three areas.  
 
Research findings suggest that, overall, IOs had greater effect at the level of policy interpretation 
and implementation than on policy formation.  With regard to the latter, IOs’ effectiveness was 
limited to policy elements that were not highly politicized and divisive domestically, while on 
issues that were politicized, domestic political considerations were the main determinants of 
policy progress.  The paper identifies “best practices” and most successful strategies of IOs in 
operating in a transition country, and specific features of the political, economic, and legal 
environment that sets a transition country apart from stable polities.  Finally, the paper calls for an 
appropriate approach by international actors.   
 
Research presented in this paper is part of a larger project (Ph.D. dissertation in progress) that 
examines variations in the effect of formal international organizations on refugee and citizenship 
policies in four post-Communist countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine and Russia).  For 
this paper the author conducted research Ukraine (in the capital Kiev, and on the Crimean 
peninsula in Simferopol, Bakhchisarai and Yalta) on the effect the UNHCR and some other 
international organizations have had on citizenship policies in this country.  Research 
methodology consisted of extensive interviews with staff of IOs in Kiev and in Crimea, Ukrainian 
government officials, NGO representatives, and Crimean Tatar leaders, and reading of IO and 
government documents, Ukrainian press reports, and proceedings from UNHCR-organized 
conferences and workshops on citizenship problems in Ukraine.  
 
                                                  
1 This study was supported by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. 
2 The author is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government, Harvard University and a Graduate Student 
Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. 
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II.  Introduction and summary: The Citizenship Problem of FDPs in Ukraine and its 
Solution (1991- 999) 
 
When Soviet citizenship ceased to exist in December 1991, some 287 million people were left 
with or in need of a new citizenship.  Ukraine, like most of the successor states of the USSR (with 
the notable exception of the Baltic States), defined the initial body of citizens in an inclusive way, 
on the basis of residency in the territory of the country.  The Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of 
Ukraine” adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 8 October 1991 recognized as Ukrainian 
citizens “persons who at the moment of the entry of this law into force (13 November 1991) have 
been residing in Ukraine, regardless of origin, social and property position, or racial or national 
affiliation, sex, education, language, political views, religious convictions, and type and nature of 
occupation, who are not citizens of other states.”3   
 
The inclusive principle of the law, however, did not prevent the emergence of the citizenship 
problem that soon drew the attention of the world community.  The problem arose as a result of 
the massive return to the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine of Crimean Tatars and other formerly-
deported peoples (FDPs) who had been deported en masse from Crimea by the Soviet regime in 
1944 on charges of collaboration with the Nazis.4  Mass return to Crimea started in the late 
1980s, after the Crimean Tatars won a decades-long fight with the Soviet regime for the right to 
return to their homeland, and to date approximately 258,000 have returned to Crimea where they 
now constitute about 12 percent of the population (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendices below).  
With residency in Ukraine on 13 November 1991 (the date of entry into force of the 1991 
citizenship law) being the main criterion for inclusion in the initial body of citizens, those 146,547 
FDPs who returned to Ukraine before 13 November 1991 automatically became citizens of 
Ukraine,5 while some 108,000 who returned to Ukraine after that date did not get Ukrainian 
citizenship, assuming the status of either foreigners or stateless persons (see Figure 3).   
 
                                                  
3 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakon Ukrainy ‘Pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy,’ no. 1636-XII, (8 October 1991); 
Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, no. 50, 701. 
4 Deportation and Crimean Tatars’ struggle for the right to return during the Soviet period is outside the scope of 
this paper.  For detailed discussion of these subjects see: Edward Allworth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea: Their 
Struggle for Survival. Original Studies from North America, Unofficial and Official Documents from Czarist and 
Soviet Sources, Central Asia Book Series (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); Edward Allworth, ed., The 
Tatars of the Crimea: Return to the Homeland. Studies and Documents (Durha : Duke University Press, 1998); 
Oleh Bazhan and Yurii Danyliuk, ed., Krymski tatary, 1944-1994 rr.: statti, dokumenty, svidchennia ochevydtsiv 
(Kiev: Ridnyi krai, 1995); Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: the Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (London: 
Macmillan, 1970); Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges and Prospects (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1995); Oleg Gabrielian et al., Krymskie repatrianty: deportatsia, vozvrashchenie i obustroistvo 
(Simferopol: Izdatelskii dom “Amena,” 1998); Oleg Gabrielian and Vadim Petrov, Krym--deportirovannye 
grazhdane--vozvrashchenie, obustroistvo, sotsialnaia adaptatsiia (Simferopol: Izdatelskii dom “Amena,” 1997); 
Mikhail Guboglo and Svetlana Chervonnaia, Krymskotatarskoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie, 4. V. (Moskva: 
Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Tsentr po izucheniiu mezhnatsionalnykh otnoshenii. Institut etnologii i antropologii 
im. N.N. Miklukho-Maklaia, 1992); Open Society Institute, Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention 
(New York: The Open Society Institute, 1996); Otto Pohl, The Stalinist Penal System: a Statistical History of 
Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930-195 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997); Mykola Shulha, ed., Problemy 
mihratsii ta povernennia deportovanykh v Ukrainu: materialy mizhnarodnoho sympoziuma 14-15 bereznia 1997 
roku (Kiev: Freedom House, 1997). 
5 Ukrainian Ministry of Interior data as quoted in Krymskaia Gazeta (26 November 1997).   
  
3
As Figure 3 illustrates, among the 108,000 returnees there were two categories of non- itizens.  
The first were de jure stateless FDPs (about 25,000) who left their previous country of residency 
before that country’s new citizenship legislation entered into force, and thus possessed neither 
Ukrainian nor any other citizenship.  The second, larger group (some 81,000), consisted of those 
who left their previous country of residency aft r that country’s new citizenship legislation 
entered into force.  These FDPs thus became de jure citizens of the countries of their prior 
residency.  For the majority of FDPs (61,000, or 75 percent) it was Uzbekistan; for some 13 
percent (11,000), Russia; the remaining 9,800 (12 percent) had citizenship of other CIS countries 
(Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan).  Of those with de jure citizenship of other CIS state , many 
could be considered d  facto stateless, as FDPs who repatriated to Ukraine have not effectively 
exercised their citizenship of other CIS countries.  According to the Uzbek embassy information 
given to the UNHCR, as of mid-1998 none of the returnes from Uzbekistan ever approached the 
Uzbek embassy in Kiev for diplomatic protection or assistance, nor registered with the embassy as 
Uzbek law requires.  Sociological research also indicates that many FDPs were not even aware 
that they were Uzbek citizens, commonly believing that their legal residency in Ukraine made 
them Ukrainian citizens.6  Old residency stamps in FDPs’ Soviet passports signifying their prior 
residency in Uzbekistan or another CIS country were often the only indication that they were 
legally citizens of other CIS states.  Furthermore, d  facto Uzbek citizens permanently living in 
Ukraine were at risk of becoming de jurestateless, since Article 21 (2) of the Uzbek citizenship 
law foresees loss of Uzbek citizenship “where a person permanently residing abroad has not 
registered without good reasons in a consular institution [of Uzbekistan] within five years.”7  
 
For reasons that will be elaborated in the next section of this paper, until 1997 prospects of policy 
change remained virtually deadlocked because of conflicting interests around this issue, as well as 
legal and informational hurdles.  By the mid-1990s, the citizenship problem of FDPs in Ukraine 
received international attention and IOs became involved in trying to find a solution to the lack of 
Ukrainian citizenship by tens of thousands of FDPs.  In line with its mandate to reduce 
statelessness received from the United National General Assembly, and in response to the request 
from the Ukrainian government, the UNHCR was the first in ernational organization to get most 
actively involved in the search for a solution to the citizenship problem of some 107,000 returnees 
who did not have Ukrainian citizenship.  The Council of Europe (COE) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were also involved in trying to solve the citizenship 
dilemma of formerly deported people in Ukraine.   
 
Section IV of this paper will analyze the activities of these IOs, and their impact on the policy 
changes that took place after 1996 when the IOs  became actively involved with the citizenship 
issue.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate progress in the reduction of statelessness in Ukraine, and 
affiliation to Ukrainian citizenship of FDPs who were Uzbek citizens.  As Figure 4 illustrates, in 
the period between 1992 and 1996 only about 300 FDPs have received Ukrainian citizenship.  
April 1997 amendments to the citizenship law, which removed a number of criteria the FDPs had 
                                                  
6 Iryna Pribytkova, Examination of the Citizenship Issue on the Return and Reintegration of the Formerly 
Deported Peoples in Crimea (Kiev: UNHCR, 1998). 
7 “Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan” reprinted in IOM, Sbornik 
zakonodatelnykh aktov gosudarstv SNG i Baltii po voprosam migratsii, grazhdanstva i sviazannym s nimi 
aspektami (International Organization for Migration, 1995), 372-84. There has been no precedent of an Uzbek 
citizen in Ukraine losing his Uzbek citizenship under this provision of the Uzbek citizenship law, however.   
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to fulfill to obtain Ukrainian citizenship, such as a source of income, knowledge of the Ukrainian 
language, and a five year residency requirement (see Table 1 in the appendix), opened the door to 
Ukrainian citizenship to those who were de ju  stateless.8 As seen in Figure 5, by June 1999 all 
25,000 stateless FDPs had acquired Ukrainian citizenship, and thus the problem of statelessness 
was resolved.   
 
Even after the April 1997 amendments, however, the citizenship problem was far from over.  
Some 82,000 FDPs in Ukraine who were de jure citizens of other CIS states were still unable to 
acquire Ukrainian citizenship, barred by the requirement that they obtain documented proof of 
release from other citizenship.  The requirement, as will be elaborated below, presented virtually 
insurmountable material and logistic obstacles for the overwhelming majority of FDPs.  It was not 
until the August 1998 agreement between Ukraine and Uzbekistan that the majority of FDPs 
(who were Uzbek citizens—see Figure 3) were able to apply for Ukrainian citizenship.  As Figure 
6 illustrates, as of October 1999 almost 70 percent of FDPs with Uzbek citizenship (43,000 
persons) have applied for Ukrainian citizenship under the procedure set forth in the August 1998 
Ukrainian-Uzbek agreement.  For those FDPs who hold citizenship in CIS countries that do no 
have such bilateral agreements with Ukraine, however, access to Ukrainian citizenship continues 
to depend on their obtaining a proof of release from previous citizenship.   
 
Given this evolution of Ukraine’s citizenship policy after the involvement of IOs in id-1990s, the 
central question this study asks is, what was the role of IOs in these policy changes? The rest of 
this paper will be devoted to answering this question.   
 
 
III.  The Situation Prior to International Involvement: Conflicting Domestic Political 
Interests, and Political and Legal Impediments to Policy Changes
 
The need to focus research agendas on specifying the logic and mechanisms of “complex dynamic 
processes” that characterize the interaction between international and domestic politics—in other 
words, to bridge the division between studies of international and domestic politics—has been 
emphasized for over two decades,9 and continues to be emphasized today.10 International actors 
and institutions project their influence not in a domestic vacuum, but in an environment where 
certain interests, coalitions and institutional arrangements are in place.  Therefore, whether and 
how an IO can achieve its policy objectives depends not only on the attributes of IOs (such as 
staff professionalism or sufficient budget), but also on the constellation of political interests in the 
domestic environment where IOs operate, and IOs’ ability to understand and effectively navigate 
                                                  
8 Amended citizenship law from 16 April 1997. Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakon Ukrainy ‘Pro hromadianstvo 
Ukrainy’, no. 210-97BP (16 April 1997); Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, no. 23, 169. 
9 As early as 1976, Peter Katzenstein called for ending this division.  See Peter Katzenstein, “International 
Relations and Domestic Political Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” 
International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976). 
10 See, for example, Robert Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Political 
Structures”; Helen Milner, I terests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);  
Helen Milner, “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of  International, American, and Comparative 
Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998). 
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these interests.  Therefore, before moving on to the analysis of IOs’ abilities to bring about 
changes in Ukraine’s citizenship policy, this section of the paper will outline the domestic political 
and legal environment, and conflicting domestic interests over the question of citizenship that had 
developed in Ukraine by the time IOs b came involved with this problem in the mid-1990s. 
 
As noted above, the citizenship problem in Ukraine that the Crimean Tatars and other FDPs have 
experienced stemmed from the massive return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (see Figure 2).  The citizenship law, passed in November 1991 after the Ukrainian 
Parliament adopted the Act of State Independence on 24 August 1991, did not take into account 
the consequences of the massive return of the Crimean Tatars to Ukraine.  The “triple transition” 
process—the need to engage in state building while simultaneously undertaking political and 
economic reforms—presented a unique and unprecedented challenge to state builders of the 
newly independent states on the territory of the former USSR.  Such founding laws as those 
applying to citizenship had to be adopted without delay, and in Ukraine there was additional time 
pressure to pass the law before the 1 December 1991 independence referendum in which 
Ukrainian citizens were to vote for or against Ukrainian state independence, as well as to elect 
Ukraine’s first president.  Further, once a law is in place and its norms become operational, its 
implementation can produce consequences that the law’s creators had not intended or had 
overlooked.  
 
A.  Socio-economic and Political Challenges Associated with the Crimean Tatar Return and 
Integration in Ukraine 
 
1.  Destitute Socio-economic Conditions of Crimean Tatar Returnees 
 
Crimean Tatars who returned to Ukraine found themselves in an inhospitable econ mic, social 
and political environment.  Therefore, the citizenship problem was one among many obstacles to 
integration that they have faced.  With the peak of massive Crimean Tatar return coinciding with 
the beginning of hyperinflation, many returnees saw their life-long savings and money received for 
the sale of property in their place of origin erode in a matter of months or even weeks.  The 
rapidly deteriorating economic situation, plus the unwillingness of local Crimean authorities to 
allocate housing and land to returnees, have led to numerous violent clashes between the 
returnees and local police and sometimes residents, while Crimean Tatars were left in a destitute 
economic situation even in comparison with the depressed and deteriorating economy in Crim a 
and Ukraine.11   Currently, as many as an estimated 60 percent of Crimean Tatars are unemployed 
(at least double the rate for Crimea as a whole), and around 50 percent lack proper housing.  Out 
of 291 Crimean Tatar settlements, around 25 percent do not have electricity, 70 percent are 
without water, 90 percent without tarmac roads, 96 percent are without gas, and none has 
sewers.12    
                                                  
11 For more detailed discussion of socio-ec nomic and political difficulties experienced by the returning FDPs see, 
for example, Allworth, ed., The Tatars of the Crimea: Return to the Homeland. Studies and Documents; 
Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges and Prospects; Gabrielian et al., Krymskie repatrianty: 
deportatsia, vozvrashchenie i obustroistvo; Guboglo and Chervonnaia, Krymskotatarskoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie;  
Open Society Institute, Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention. 
12 Ukrainian government statistics cited in Committee on Migration, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 
Refugees and Demography. Repatriation and Integration of the Tatars of Crimea, no. 8655 (18 February 2000), 
available from http://stars.coe.fr/doc00/EDOC8655.htm.  Also see Remzi Iliasov, “Analiz sotsialno-
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2.  Crimean Tatars and Political Conflict over Crimea’s Status within Ukraine 
 
In addition to having pressing socio-economic problems, Crimean Tatars also became the center 
of high-profile political conflict concerning Ukraine’s jurisdiction over the Crimean peninsula.  
Crimea became part of Ukraine in February 1954 after being transferred from Russia to Ukraine 
by the Soviet government.  After Ukraine gained independence, Crimea became a bone of 
contention between Russia and Ukraine, with the Russian parliament and many prominent Russian 
politicians questioning the legality of the 1954 transfer.  Crimea was the only region in Ukraine 
where Russians were in the majority (64 percent of the population, with Ukrainians being 23 
percent, and the Crimean Tatars currently at around 12 percent).  Not only ethnically and 
linguistically, but also politically, Crimea was not a region that favored Ukrainian independence, 
and this further produced tensions in the relations between Crimean authorities and the central 
Ukrainian government in Kiev.  The peninsula has enjoyed a reputation as a Communist party 
stronghold because of its status as a playground for the Communist no e klatura in the Soviet 
period, its popularity as a retirement site for high-level government officials, and the substantial 
military and naval presence (the Black Sea Fleet is based in the Crimean port of Sevastopol).  The 
majority of the Crimean electorate has supported the Communist and pro-R ssian forces, as is 
illustrated by the consistently strong showing of these political forces during local and national 
elections in Crimea.13 
 
As such, the political and ideological orientations of the majority of the Crimean electorate and 
Crimean leadership were in stark contrast to those of the majority of the Crimean Tatars.  
Harboring grievances against the Soviet regime and Communist ideology, the majority of the 
Crimean Tatars are staunchly anti-Communist, and Crimean Tatar leaders tend to see the 
Ukrainian state as their only ally against the hostile stand of local Crimean leaders.  Such strategic 
rationale, as well as long-standing personal ties between Crimean Tatars leaders and Ukrainian 
dissidents, made the Crimean Tatars the main supporters of Ukrainian independence in Crimea, 
and Ukraine’s jurisdiction over the peninsula.  Their pro-Ukra nian position made the Crimean 
Tatars natural allies of the pro-Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and in Crimea.  Referring to the 
weakness of local pro-Ukrainian forces, Crimean Tatar leaders like to say that Crimean Tatars are 
“the only Ukrainians in Crimea.”14   
                                                                                                                                                     
ekonomichnoho stanovyscha krymskotatarskoho narodu v Krymu,” in Sotialno-Ekonomichni aspekty intehratsii 
krymskykh tatar. Materialy ‘kruhloho stoly.’ 17 bereznia 1999 roku (Kiev: Ukrainsky Nezalezhny Tsentr 
Politychnykh Doslidzhen, 1999), 51. 
13 Following elections on 28 March 1998, the Communists became the largest group in the current Crimean 
parliament with 32 out of  91 deputies elected that day (election results as rep rted in Krym koie Vremia, 30 April 
1998), and 34 out of 48 (or 71 percent) of the deputies elected to the Simferopol city soviet (election results in 
Krymskoie Vremia, 25 April 1998). During the March 1998 Ukrainian parliamentary elections, the Communist 
party received 25 percent of the votes on the party list vote in Ukraine overall, while in Crimea it got 39 percent. 
(Party list voting results as listed at the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine’s web site at 
http://195.230.157.53:8082/index.htm). Finally, during the November 1999 Ukrainian presidential elections, in 
Crimea Communist candidate Petro Symonenko came in first with 38 percent of the votes in the first round (the 
second highest vote for the Communist party candidate in Ukraine’s 27 regions), and beat incumbent president 
Leonid Kuchma in the second round 51 percent to 44 percent (1999 Presidential election results listed at the 
Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine’s web site at http://195.230.157.53:8082/vp1i/owa/webproc0). 
14 This describes the position of the majority of the Crimean Tatars and their leadership represented by the Mejlis 
(a 33-member permanent representative body elected by the Kurultai—a Crimean Tatar national congress).  A 
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If the Crimean Tatars’ support for Ukrainian independence has been evident and consistent, as 
demonstrated by the Crimean Tatar voting record during parliamentary and presidential 
elections,15 the central government’s support of Crimean Tatar political and legal demands has not 
been so.  In their quest for the restoration of their rights, Crimean Tatars have advanced a number 
of political and legal demands that have been viewed highly negatively by the Communist 
leadership of the Crimean parliament, and have been a cause of the on-going political 
confrontation between the Crimean Tatars and Crimea’s leadership.16  In this situation, Kiev was 
left with the difficult task of balancing virtually diametrically opposed political interests of 
Crimea’s numerically much larger “Russian-speaki g” electorate, and its smaller but highly 
organized and mobilized Tatar minority.  Given the inhospitable political climate in Crimea, 
Crimean Tatars have sided with Kiev almost by default, while Kiev has been in a position to rely 
on the Crimean Tatar support without offering much in return.   
 
B.  The Citizenship Problem of FDPs in Crimea 
 
1.  Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian Authorities: Disagreements on the Nature of the Problem and 
Solutions Needed 
 
In this context, the lack of Ukrainian citizenship was just one of many economic, social and 
political problems with which the returnees were faced.  Crimean Tatar demands for Ukrainian 
citizenship usually have been voiced as part of a larger spectrum of demands for the restoration of 
                                                                                                                                                     
notable exception to this position is the NDKT (National Movement of the Crimean Tatars), a Crimean Tatar 
organization opposed to Mejlis/Kurultai. NDKT and Mejlis leaders were at the roots of the Crimean Tatar 
movement in the 1960s, but they parted ways in the late 1980s.  During the 1994 elections to the Crim an 
Parliament, on the Crimean Tatar list NDKT received only 5 percent of the Crimean Tatar votes, while Mejlis 
received 95 percent.  NDKT’s influence has declined following the murder of its leader Yuri Osmanov in 1993.  
The NDKT’s stated political orientation is very different from that of Mejlis/Kurultai—NDKT leaders regret the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union, support the creation of a “Slavo-Turkic” Union in its place, and therefore are 
very critical of Mejlis’ cooperation with the pro-Ukrainian forces.  NDKT has called Ukraine’s rule over Crimea 
“occupational,” and has stressed the importance of working with the existing Crimean authorities and pro-Russian 
forces in Crimea. For more on the creation of and differences between Mejlis/Kurultai and the NDKT see, for 
example, Guboglo and Chervonnaia, Krymskotatarskoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie; Susan Stewart, The Tatar 
Dimension, RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 19 (1994); Andrew Wilson, “Politics In And Around Crimea: a 
Difficult Homecoming,” in Allworth, The Tatars of the Crimea, 283-86. 
15 For illustrative voting data See Oxana Shevel, “Crimean Tatars in Ukraine: The Politics of Inclusion and 
Exclusion” Analysis of Current Events 12, no. 1-2 (2000).  
16 Among the main political demands voiced by the Crimean Tatars are a need for a legal mechanism to guarantee 
Crimean Tatar representation in Crimean and Ukrainian organs of power; official recognition of the Crimean 
Tatar Mejlis; official recognition of Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people of Crimea and Ukraine rather than a 
national minority; recognition of the Crimean Tatar language as one of the official languages in Crimea; and 
establishment of national-territorial autonomy in Crimea in place of the current territorial one.  Demands detailed 
in the “Appeal of the Crimean Tatars addressed to the President of Ukraine, Peoples Deputies of Ukraine, UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the OSCE” (Avdet, 13 January 1997).  The appeal has been signed by over 
100,000 Crimean Tatars over 18 years of age, according to Mustafa Jemilev, Chairman of the Crimean Tatar 
Mejlis.  (Avdet, 24 November 1998).  For analysis of these political demands and conflicting domestic political 
interests surrounding them, see Oxana Shevel, “Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian State: the Challe ge of Politics, 
the Use of Law, and the Meaning of Rhetoric” (paper presented at the Fifth Annual World Convention of the 
American Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, NY, 13-15 April 2000) and Shevel, “Crimean 
Tatars in Ukraine: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion.” 
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their political rights, and thus have been subject to the same political controversies and tensions as 
other, more controversial issues (such as national territorial autonomy status and group 
representation).  Analysis of documents, press reports, and interviews with both Ukrainian 
government representatives and Crimean Tatar leaders indicate that on the question of citizenship, 
a de facto deadlock existed in the early and mid-1990s.   
 
The authorities were initially reluctant to acknowledge that changes to the citizenship legislation 
were necessary.  They posited that the Crimean Tatars should individually resort to existing 
citizenship acquisition procedures specified in the law, and often blamed the Crimean Tatar 
leaders for playing a “political card” by calling on the government to give Ukrainian citizenship to 
the Crimean Tatars “en masse,” instead of encouraging Crimean Tatars to apply individually 
according to existing procedures.  Crimean Tatar leaders were commonly accused by many 
Ukrainian officials of trying to keep the Crimean Tatar population disenfranchised, as this 
provided the Tatar leaders with leverage in negotiating political benefits from Ukrainian and 
Crimean authorities (such as seat quotas for the Tatars in the Crimean parliament, or collective 
Ukrainian citizenship).  The Crimean Tatar leaders, on their part, pointed out that they had never 
discouraged individual citizenship applications,17 but that the procedure was so cumbersome and 
costly that it presented virtually insurmountable logistical and material obstacles for the vast 
majority of FDPs, and thus changes were necessary.   Additionally, Crimean Tatars saw the 
existing citizenship policy as an unjust one that made Crimean Tatars hostages of Ukrainian and 
other CIS countries’ legal systems: Crimean Tatars had become Uzbek (or other CIS countries’) 
citizens against their will as a consequence of their forced deportation, and now they were 
expected to apply for and pay to be released from citizenship that they had never asked for in the 
first place. 
 
Requirements for acquiring Ukrainian citizenship are specified in Article 17 of the 1991 Law on 
Citizenship of Ukraine, and government orders regulating the application process (March 1992 
Regulation on citizenship application procedure approved by the order of the President,18 and 
unpublished instruction of the Ministry of Interior from May 1993 detailing how responsible 
officials are to handle applications19).  
 
 
 
 
                                                  
17 Indeed, as early as September 1992, the Mejlis issued a resolution recommending that all Crimean Tatars 
affiliate to Ukrainian citizenship under procedures specified in Ukrainian citizenship legislation (Mejlis’r soluti  
dated 27 September 1992, reprinted in Guboglo and Chervonnaia, Krymskot t rskoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie. 3,  
51.   
18 Prezydent Ukrainy, Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy pro poriadok rozhliadu pytan, zviazanykh z hromadianstvom 
Ukrainy, no. 196, (31 March 1992). 
19  This instruction was referred to and cancelled by the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine. Instruktsia pro poriadok 
pryiniattia, rozhliadu ta prokhodzhennia v organakh vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrainy klopotan, zaiav, inshykh 
documentiv z pytan hromadianstva Ukrainy, Ministry of Interior document no. 211, registered at the Ministry of 
Justice on 8 May 1998 under the number 292/2732 (30 March 1998). 
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Box 1 
Article 17 of the 1991 Citizenship Law —Requirements for Acquiring Ukrainian Citizenship. 
 
Conditions for acquiring Ukrainian citizenship are: 
(1) renunciation of foreign citizenship; 
(2) permanent residence on the territory of Ukraine over the last five years. 
This rule does not apply to persons who arrived in Ukraine for permanent residence and expressed a 
desire to become Ukrainian citizens provided that they were born or prove that at least one of their 
parents, grandfather, or grandmother was born on its territory and are not citizens of other states;20 
(3) knowledge of Ukrainian language at a level sufficient for communication; 
(4) availability of legal sources of income; 
(5) recognition of and compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine. 
 
In practice, the procedure has been extremely lengthy, cumbersome, and costly, and indeed 
insurmountable for many returnees.  In one of its bulletins, he “Assistance” Foundation, an NGO 
established with the assistance of the UNHCR to help FDPs apply for Ukrainian citizenship,  
described in detail all stages of a sample case of citizenship application by an FDP.  The procedure 
took about a year in Ukraine, plus another six to twelve months to obtain an Uzbek certificate of 
release.  Among the documents an applicant had to submit, in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in the government’s interpretation of the law, were certificates from a psychiatrist, 
dermatologist, venereal disease hospital, and AIDS testing facility.  All these certificates had to be 
paid for, and the applicant had to travel, usually several times, to establishments issuing them.  
The cost of obtaining all required documents was 73 hryvnia at a time when the average monthly 
wage in Crimea was 132.5 hryvnia.21 
 
Given over 60 percent unemployment among the Crimean Tatars, and their settlements in remote 
areas often without easy access to transportation, many found these requirements all th  more 
insurmountable.  The US$100 fee charged by the Uzbek authorities for the certificate confirming 
release from Uzbek citizenship—a requirement beyond all those set by the Ukrainian side—was 
well beyond the means of the returnees.  Those who were de jure stateless and thus did not have 
to obtain a certificate of release from prior citizenship still had to fulfill all other requirements.  
Being recent returnees, most of the Crimean Tatars did not satisfy the five year residency 
requirement; furthe , to prove their ancestors’ origin from the territory of Ukraine was a onerous 
task for many, especially for those whose ancestors had been born in Ukraine but died in places of 
deportation, as the archives containing data on those deported were often incompl te or 
destroyed.  Documentation of a legal source of income was also an impediment, since the majority 
were unemployed and survived by small trading, gardening, and other such unregistered income-
generating activities.   
 
As a result of all these obstacles to acquiring citizenship, Crimean Tatar leaders demanded a 
policy decision that would grant all returnees Ukrainian citizenship automatically on the basis of 
                                                  
20 This paragraph was added to the law on 28 January 1993 by Law no. 2949-12 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. Zakon 
pro vensennia zmin i dopovnen do Zakonu Ukrainy ‘Pro hromadianstvo’, no. 2949-XII (28 January 1993); 
Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, no. 14, 121. 
21 Fera Abkhairova, “Legko-li stat grazhdaninom Ukrainy?” Grazhdanin, 1, no. 4 (1997). The fees for documents 
convert to approximately US$29, at a time when the average monthly wage was about US$53. 
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written application.  This demand, as worded in the January 1997 Appeal cited above,22 sked 
Ukraine “to give Ukrainian citizenship to all Crimean Tatars and members of their families who 
live in Crimea and expressed desire to become Ukrainian citizens.  The Appeal also asked the 
authorities to amend the law ‘On citizenship of Ukraine’ so that it would enable Crimean Tatars 
and members of their families who return to Crimea for permanent residency to obtain Ukrainian 
citizenship by way of application and without being subjected to any limiting requirements.”23 
 
2.  Ukraine’s Insistence on the SinglC tizenship Principle and Avoidance of Dual Citizenship 
with Russia: Consequences for the Crimean Tatars 
 
Such demands of the Crimean Tatars were rebutted by the authorities on the grounds that 
citizenship affiliation is an individual decision requiring p rsonal application, as well for fear of 
possible negative political and geopolitical consequences of a decision that would enable Crimean 
Tatars who were d  jure citizens of Uzbekistan and other CIS states to become Ukrainian citizens 
at the same time.  Ukraine’s insistence on the individual application procedure, and in particular 
on the requirement to obtain official proof of release from their prior citizenship, stemmed from 
Ukraine’s determination to adhere to the single citizenship principle in law and n practice nd the 
fear of negative consequences of dual citizenship, in particular with Russia, for Ukrainian 
statehood.   
 
While Ukrainian national-democratic politicians and groups have insisted on the single citizenship 
principle as a way to consolidate new Ukrainian statehood, leftist forces have favored dual 
citizenship, in particular with Russia.  Since the early 1990s, the issue of single citizenship has 
become a controversial and highly politicized one in Ukraine, and it was the issue that sparked 
most of the debate when the first citizenship law was discussed in the parliament in the fall of 
1991.24  After heated debates on the issue during the first and second readings of the 1991 
citizenship law in October 1991 and several failed rounds of voting, a c mpromise was struck and 
was reflected in Article 1 of the 1991 law, which read: “In Ukraine there is a single citizenship.  
Dual citizenship is allowed on the basis of bilateral international agreements.”   
 
This wording was supported by those MPs who favored dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, since 
it was expected at the time of the debate that in due course Ukraine would conclude a bilateral 
agreement with Russia to establish dual citizenship.  However, Ukraine never concluded any such 
agreement, despite advocacy for it by Russia and many political forces in Ukraine.  The principle 
of single citizenship was further strengthened with the passage of the Constitution in 1996 (Article 
4 of the Constitution states “in Ukraine there is a single citizenhip”), and April 1997 amendments 
to the Ukrainian citizenship law, which removed the clause on possible dual citizenship on the 
basis of bilateral agreements, citing the need to put the law in line with the Constitution, and 
overriding objectives by advoctes of dual citizenship. 
 
                                                  
22 See footnote 16.
23 Avdet, 13 January 1997. 
24 See verbatim report of the parliamentary discussion of the citizenship law.  First reading: Verkhovna Rada 
Ukrainy, “Zakon Ukrainy pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy - pershe chytannia,” in Bulletin # 7 (Kiev: Verkhovna Rada 
Ukrainy, 1991).  Second reading: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, “Zakon Ukrainy pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy - ruhe 
chytannia,” in Bulletin # 18 (Kiev: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1991). 
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Ukraine, as its Deputy Foreign Minister noted, feared  
negative consequences of dual citizenship for Ukraine’s national interest….The 
presence of people with dual citizenship in regions where a minority compactly 
resides…in a certain manner stimulates anti-Co stitutional ‘pro-autonomy’ 
activities of certain political forces, which will lead to increased socio-political 
tensions in the country….Concluding agreements on dual citizenship may in the 
future lead to forceful interference by one state into internal affairs of the other 
under the pretext of protecting the rights of its citizens25 
—a clear reference to the situation around Crimea, albeit in diplomatic language.   
 
Furthermore, implications for Ukraine of the Russian citizenship law itself were cause for 
Ukraine’s concern.  Article 13(2) of the 1991 Russian citizenship law recognizes as Russian 
citizens by birth those former Soviet citizens born after 30 December 1922 who were born, or at 
least one of whose parents was born, on the territory of the Russian Federation.  “Territory of 
Russian Federation is understood to mean territory that was part of the Russian Federation at the 
moment of a person’s birth.”26  This last provision of the law basically recognizes all residents of 
Crimea born between December 1922 and 1954 (when Crimea was transferred from Russia to 
Ukraine) and their descendents as Russian citizens by birth.   
 
Although Ukraine’s concern over negative consequences of dual citizenship with Russia for the 
development of Ukrainian statehood was the driving force behind its insistence on single 
citizenship, the Crimean Tatars with de jurecitizenship of Uzbekistan and other CIS states 
became inadvertent victims of this concern—a  iro ic situation, given that Crimean Tatars have 
been consistent supporters of Ukrainian statehood.  However, the authorities feared that allowing 
Crimean Tatars who held citizenship of other CIS states to acquire Ukrainian citizenship without 
official proof of release from previous citizenship would create a precedent of dual citizenship, 
and could be used by those forces who favored dual citizenship with Russia.  As one Western 
official put it during an interview, “if not for concerns about Russia, the Crimean Tatar citizenship 
problem in Ukraine would not have existed in the first place.”27 
 
 
IV.  Changes in Ukrainian Citizenship Policy and the Role of International Organizations  
 
As the above discussion seeks to illustrate, the FDPs’ citizenship problem in Ukraine was 
embedded in a web of political complexities and legal deficiencies, and until the mid-1990s the 
situation was one of a virtual stand-off between the Crimean Tatar leaders, who were demanding 
that the government solve the citizenship problem for them as a group, and the authorities, who 
tended to deny that current policy was sub-optimal and blamed the Crimean Tatars themselves for 
not actively pursuing Ukrainian citizenship by way of individual applications.   
 
                                                  
25 Volodymyr Khandogii, “Dvostoronni uhody, scho spriamovani na vyrishennia pytan’ hromadianstva,” in 
Bizhentsi ta mihratsia: Ukrainskyi chasopys prava i polityky 1, n . 2 (1997): 16-17. 
26 IOM, Sbornik zakonodatelnykh aktov gosudarstv SNG i Baltii po voprosam migratsii, grazhdanstva i 
sviazannym s nimi aspektami: 280-95. 
27 Kiev, June 1999.  The official wished to remain anonymous. 
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In the mid-1990s, when the problem attracted the attention of international orga izations, IOs 
faced the difficult task of finding a solution that would be acceptable to all the parties involved.  
As described in Section IV(B) below, by mid-1999 significant progress had been achieved—
statelessness among FDPs was eliminated entirely, and procedures enabling the majority of FDPs 
to become Ukrainian citizens were put in place.  Section IV of this paper analyzes to what extent 
these changes were a product of IOs’ efforts.   
 
Section IV(A) analyses the Ukrainian government’s acknowledgement, by 1995, that changes to 
the citizenship policy were indeed necessary.  Section IV(A)1 summarizes the developments and 
events that led to this decision, while section IV(A)2 analyzes the importance of the IOs in 
bringing about this decision.   
 
Section IV(B) analyzes specific changes to different elements of the citizenship policy that took 
place after 1995, and IOs’ influence with regard to each of these policy changes.  Section IV(B)1  
details changes to different policy elements that were initited, wh le section IV(B)2 assesses the 
impact of the IOs in each instance. 
 
A.  Ukraine’s Acknowledgement that Citizenship Policy Needs to be Changed: The Role of IOs 
 
1.  How the Problem Gained Attention of IOs, and How Ukrainian Authorities Moved to Amend 
the Citizenship Law 
 
Changes to Ukrainian citizenship legislation involved both an official acknowledgement that the 
existing policy was sub-optimal and changes were needed, and, once such an acknowledgement 
was made, decisions on the precise changes to be undertaken.  As discussed above, until the mid-
1990s there was no consensus on the part of the government acknowledging that the existing 
citizenship policy in practice (even if not in theory) precluded the vast majority of Crimean Tatars 
from become Ukrainian citizens.  For Crimean Tatars themselves, who were struggling to deal 
with many socio-economic and political challenges, citizenship was just one of many concerns.  
By 1995, however, the issue was coming to the forefront of government concerns, as well as 
those of international organizations.   
 
Between late 1994 and early 1995, UNHCR and OSCE established their presence in Ukraine.  
The UNHCR permanent office in Ukraine opened in June 1995.  The UNHCR representative 
visited Crimea in July 1995, and a detailed fact-finding mission to Crimea was conducted in 
February 1996.  With the initial focus of its activities being refugees in Ukraine, the organization 
soon became involved with FPD problems in Crimea, where some persons were found to be in 
refuge-like situations; UNHCR’s mandate to prevent and reduce statelessness also prompted its 
involvement in the FDPs’ citizenship problem.   
 
The other IO actively involved was the OSCE.  The OSCE Mission to Ukraine was established in 
June 1994 and became operational in November 1994.  The primary task of the mission was to 
“facilitate the dialogue between the central Government and the Crimean authorities” over the 
status of Crimea within Ukraine, but the mission’s responsibility also included “preparing reports 
on the situation of human rights and rights of persons belonging to national minorities in the 
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Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”28  In October 1995, after the problem of citizenship was 
discussed at a September 1995 round-table in Crimea organized by the OSCE, the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, wrote a letter to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in which he referred to the problem of the acquisition of Ukrainian 
citizenship by FDPs as “one of the most urgent questions to be settled,” and urged Ukraine to 
consider the option of granting Ukrainian citizenship to deportees and their descendants “if they 
sign a declaration renouncing the citizenship of the states they have left.”29   
 
At the same time as IOs were establishing their presence in Ukraine and beginning operations in 
Crimea, the IOs were further stimulated to give higher priority to the FDPs’ citizenship problem 
by the strategy of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, which was aimed at attracting international attention 
to the plight of the Crimean Tatar people.  Since 1994, the Crimean Tatar leaders had held a 
growing number of meetings with representatives of Western governments and international 
organizations in Ukraine—in 1993 just two such meetings were conducted; i 1994 there were 
over two dozen.30  Crimean Tatar leaders also traveled to various European countries and IO 
headquarters to speak about their problems at international forums and conferences, some held 
under UN auspices.   
 
By the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian government itself had come to desire international involvement 
and assistance for Crimean Tatar resettlement in Ukraine.  Struck by economic crisis, Ukraine was 
not capable of independently financing Crimean Tatar repatriation—according to the estimates, as 
much as US$2 billion would be needed to cover the costs of Crimean Tatar integration and return, 
and funds the Ukrainian government was able to allocate to this purpose had to be reduced year 
after year.  Substantial international assistance was the only possibility to improve the dire 
economic situation of FDPs, which could otherwise become a cause of socio-political crisis.  IOs’ 
involvement in Crimea was further welcomed by the Ukrainian government because of its 
protracted political confrontation with local Crimean authorities over the definition of Crimea’s 
status within Ukraine.  While some organizations, especially the OSCE, initially were involved 
mainly in mediating relations between central Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, they soon 
became occupied with the problems of FDPs in Crimea, as Crimean Tatars were a crucial ethnic 
group for the maintenance of overall stability in the region. 
 
The May 1996 CIS Regional Conference on Refugees and Migrants, which was called by the 
UNHCR and took place in Geneva, systematically addressed population displacement in the CIS, 
including concerns of formerly deported peoples, and thus brought the problems of FDPs in 
Ukraine, including that of citizenship, to the attention of Western donors, governments, and a 
number of IOs.  Since that time, it has not left the agenda of IOs operating in Ukraine.   
 
As a result of all these developments, in the spring of 1995 a decision was taken by the Ukrainian 
government to prepare a new edition of the citizenship law.  A working group to draft changes 
                                                  
28 OSCE, “The OSCE Mission to Ukraine,” (10 August 1998). Available from 
http://www.osce.org/e/docs/survey/ukraine.htm. 
29 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, “Letter to Hennady Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine, and the letter of reply,” Prague OSCE Documentation Center reference number REF.HC/10/95 (12 
October 1995). Available from http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/recomm/ukraine/1995/27hc105.html. 
30 Mejlis Krymskotatarskogo naroda, Kratkaia khronika deiatelnosti Mejlisa krymskotatarskogo naroda. Iiul 1991 
- iiun 1996 (Simferopol: 1996). 
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was set up, and the new edition of the citizenship law was submitted to the Ukrainian parliament 
in mid-1996.  
 
2.  Impact of IOs on the Ukrainian Government’s Decision to Change the Citizenship Law 
 
Because the Ukrainian government’s 1995 decision to initiate amendments to the citizenship law 
was taken at about the same time as IOs were beginning to establish their presence in Ukraine, 
one cannot claim with certainty that IOs were the main determinants of this decision, or, in other 
words, that the government would not have taken such a decision on its own initiative.  Rather, a 
combination of factors and events that took place at that period of time resulted in the decision of 
the Ukrainian government to initiate amendments to the citizenship law, with IOs’ advocacy for 
such changes being one of the factors. 
 
However, it is likely that the IOs’ advocacy for changes in the Ukrainian citizenship policy did, at 
the very least, speed up the government’s decision.  In terms of the consequences of the existing 
citizenship policy for FDPs, the situation in 1995 was no different from that of previous years, 
when the government was reluctant to acknowledge that changes were in order.  After the 
involvement of IOs, pressure for policy changes acquired an international dimension.  In this light, 
the decision of the government to initiate changes to the law seems consistent with the 
government’s growing interest in international financial support for the FDPs’ resettlement, as 
well as for political approval from western democracies.   
 
Some of the approaches and strategies that the IOs themselves took further stimulated the 
Ukrainian government’s willingness to consider citizenship policy changes.  Since the Ukrainian 
government was keenly interested in financial and material assistance from the international 
community, the UNHCR, as one of its very first projects,  engaged in financing the rehabilitation  
of communal buildings in Crimea for the most vulnerable FDPs, many of whom were in refugee-
like situations.  The organization also provided computer and office equipment to the relevant 
Ukrainian governmental agencies.  Quick and visible outcomes of such activities served to build 
confidence and also paved the way for the government’s future receptivity to UNHCR initiatives 
and policy recommendations.   
 
Another area of UNHCR’s and other IOs’ activities in Ukraine that proved to produce very 
beneficial consequences—given the specifics of the environment in which the IOs operated—was 
the organization of various round-tables and seminars.  Such meetings (some organized by the 
UNHCR on an annual basis, and others more frequently, at different intervals) brought together 
representatives of international organizations, officials from relevant governmntal a encies, 
Ukrainian MPs from relevant committees, Crimean Tatar leaders, and some NGOs.  In the 
domestic political and institutional context of Ukraine such meetings were particularly important 
forums for a number of reasons.   
 
First, unlike in developed democracies that have well-estab ished and long-functioning 
governmental institutions, and established procedures for interaction and exchange of information 
between various government organs and outside institutions, in Ukraine such procedures are not
yet firmly in place.  As a result, the dissemination of information is often sub-optimal, ot only 
between the government and outside organizations, but also between different branches of 
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government, and between the central and regional offices of the sam  branch of government.  
Forums such as these round-tables and conferences were therefore particularly valuable, because 
there members of the government in their presentations (which they were requested by the 
UNHCR to prepare also in written form for subsequent publication) detailed the position of the 
government on different elements of citizenship policy, its interpretation of legal provisions, 
challenges that the government encountered during its work, and plans for policy changes.   
 
Since, in practice, the letter of the law was usually implemented by means of administrative 
decrees issued by one or another government agency, it was not uncommonly the case that other 
agencies were unaware of planned decrees, or confused about how certain provisions wee to be 
interpreted in practice when applied to particular cases.  Therefore, these forums served an 
additional function of clarification and discussion among government experts on how the letter of 
the law was to be interpreted in practice.  Since in addtion to senior officials from the central 
ministries, practitioners from the regions who worked with often complex individual cases of FDP 
applicants were also present, policy-makers of different levels and of different agencies could 
draw links between the situation on the ground and policy responses, while UNHCR could 
develop a fuller understanding of the current situation and its main problems. 
 
The function of facilitating communication between branches of the government and central and 
regional officials that these UNHCR-organized seminars and round-tables played may seem trivial 
in the context of a developed country with a functioning state.  However, in the context of a post-
Communist country engaged in the simultaneous processes of state-building and development, the 
importance of such meetings cannot be underestimated.  Given economic crisis and dire under-
funding on all levels, it was often the case that officials located in different regions simply could 
not communicate among themselves, because even the costs of long-distance phone calls was 
more than their budgets could cover.  This made the dissemination of information and clarification 
of approaches towards the interpretation of different government orders, as well as identification 
of practical problems uncovered at the local level but requiring action by central authorities, a 
slow and complex task.   
 
Second, the UNHCR sponsorship of forums that brought together various government officials 
and enabled them to discuss many outstanding problems at the same time, also enabled the 
UNHCR to become better aware of the specifics and outstanding challenges, and thus to better 
formulate its strategy on how and when to get involved.  In Western countries the UNHCR and 
other IOs can rely on standard channels of information dissemination from the authorities, as well 
as on more expensive informational networks consisting of NGOs, academics, and other 
resources.  In the post-C mmunist countries in transition, however, such sources of information 
are few and inconsistent.  In such an environment, informal contacts with policy-makers are all the 
more important: they commonly serve as one of the main sources from which the IOs and other 
observers can obtain information on policy progress and plans being made by th  government.
 
Third, another positive effect of the forums that the UNHCR has sponsored in Ukraine has been 
the venue they presented for the government representatives and the Crimean Tatar leaders to 
meet and discuss their different opinions in a neutral setting under the “mediation” of international 
actors.  In an often tense domestic political climate, with political tensions running high around 
the Crimean Tatars’ political demands, the availability of a forum where the main interlocutors can 
  
16
meet and discuss the problems with international observers can be very beneficial.  Such a setting 
encourages a search for compromise: the authorities would not wish to be seen by international 
observers as dismissing Crimean Tatar demands off hand; nor would it be in the interests of 
Crimean Tatars to look like “radicals” in the eyes of the IOs by putting forth demands that were 
too broad or too radical.  The forums indeed had such moderating effects on a number of 
occasions.  For example, after the first such seminar in July 1996, the government apparently 
realized it had significantly underestimated the number of people willing to apply, and had only a 
limited understanding of the logistical and legal barriers the procedures posed for potential FDP 
applicants.  The government then reportedly invited proposals from the Crimean Tatars for 
practical changes in the administrative procedure for acquiring citizenship, when it became 
apparent that the existing procedure did not take into account the complex situation of many
FDPs and discouraged them from initiating applications.   
 
Finally, since the UNHCR, given its mandate, was involved only with the citizenship problem of 
the Crimean Tatars (but not other political problems), this allowed the issue of citizenship to be 
“depoliticized” and to be separated from other contested questions such as voting rights, the 
nature of Crimea’s autonomy, and Crimean Tatar representation in the government organs.  As 
the next section will show, depoliticization is important, as the more politicized a policy issue has 
been, the less likely are IOs to be able to promote policy changes on such issues.   
 
B.  Introduction of Changes to Different Elements of Ukrainian Citizenship Policy 
 
1.  Policy Elements Amended by the 1997 Ukrainian Citize ship Law and the 1998 Ukrainian-
Uzbek Bilateral Agreement 
 
Table 1 in the appendix compares provisions of the 1991 citizenship law, amendments as 
proposed by the government working group and approved during the first reading of the law in 
October 1996, and final provisions as reflected in the new citizenship law passed by the parliament 
in April 1997.  The law has substantially liberalized requirements for acquisition of Ukrainian 
citizenship for those with ancestral roots in Ukraine.  The new law exmpted FDPs (and their 
children and grandchildren) from the 5-year residency requirements, knowledge of Ukrainian 
language, and proof of legal sources of income.  The FDPs and their descendants could apply for 
affiliation to citizenship under a simple procedure until the end of 1999, and after that date, under 
a naturalization procedure that was also simplified for them.  One requirement that remained 
unchanged was the necessity to document release from previous citizenship for those FDPs who 
were de facto citizens of Uzbekistan or other countries.   
 
Interviews with participants in the law discussion process, and examination of minutes from the 
parliament during the readings of the citizenship law, revealed the domestic preferences on the 
issues that had emerged by 1997.  In Box 2 below, the dark shaded areas in the top row show 
what policies were eventually reflected in the final law passed in April 1997, while the light 
shaded areas highlight issues over which the interests of different groups diverged. 
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Box 2 – Support From Different Interest Groups for Amendments to Citizenship Law 
 
Proposed Amendments to Citizenship Law 
Interest Group 
Eliminating 5 
year residency 
requirement 
Eliminating 
official source 
of income  
requirement 
Eliminating 
knowledge of 
Ukrainian language 
requirement 
Eliminating proof of 
release from previous 
citizenship requirement 
Ukrainian government, in 
particular Citizenship 
Department of the 
Presidential Administration, 
and other law drafters 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Crimean Tatar Mejlis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Political forces in the 
parliament: 
 
-- Left & Left/Center 
 
   
No one 
objected 
during law 
discussion in 
parliament 
 
No one 
Objected during 
law discussion 
in parliament 
 
-- Yes, but not just 
for FDPs, but to 
eliminate completely 
from the law 
 
 
Generally Yes, since 
dual citizenship was 
favored 
 
 
-- Right & Right/Center 
  -- Far Right and 
some Center Right 
objected  
Generally No, since 
single citizenship was 
favored 
 
Verbatim reports from the readings of the law in the parliament reveal which proposed 
amendments to the citizenship law turned out to be most contested.  The first reading of the new 
edition of the citizenship law took place on 30 October 1996, and as soon as the discussion began, 
it became clear that the two most contested provi ions would be the language requirement and the 
issue of dual citizenship to which the requirement to obtain proof of release from previous 
citizenship before applying for Ukrainian citizenship was linked (see shaded sections in the box 
above).  Most of the debate—on the floor of the parliament as well as during meetings of the 
committee between the first and second readings—have centered around these provisions.  
 
The introductory section of this paper explained why, in the context of Ukrainian state building 
and Ukraine’s relations with Russia, the question of dual citizenship was so politicized, and this 
was also evident during the debates in the parliament.  The language question in Ukraine has been 
politicized for similar reasons.  Heavy Russification during the Soviet period prompted national-
democratic politicians in Ukraine to make it a policy priority to reverse the consequences of 
Soviet-era policy and to promote the use of Ukrainian in all spheres of public life, making it the 
state language.  However, the majority of the leftist forces, as well as populations in the eastern 
and southern regions of the country that were most Russified and where the majority of Ukraine’s 
11 million strong Russian community resides, have long favored state and/or offici l st tus for the 
Russian language.  Discussion of the citizenship law’s provision making knowledge of Ukrainian a 
requirement for citizenship was seen by the leftist groups as an opportunity to oppose the measure 
and seek its removal from the law completely.  Some rightist MPs, on their part, were unhappy 
that the law exempted some groups, including Crimean Tatars and other FDPs, from this 
requirement, and insisted that the language requirement ought to apply to everyone.  The eventual 
solution was  compromise that kept the language requirement in the law, while exempting certain 
categories of people with family origin from the territory of Ukraine.31   
                                                  
31 It is important to note that the exception—worded as “persons who were born or resided permanently on the 
territory of Ukraine, as well as their descendants (children, grandchildren)”—see Table 1—was territorially, not 
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After the new citizenship law was adopted and entered into force on 20 May 1997, it opened the 
way to Ukrainian citizenship for those FDPs who were de jure stateless and thus could make use 
of the simplified affiliation procedure at once, as the requirement to obtain a proof of release from 
previous citizenship did not apply to them.  However, this requirement (stemming from Ukraine’s 
desire to uphold the single citizenship principle) continued to bar over 80,000 FDPs who held 
citizenship of other CIS states from becoming Ukrainian citizens, as material and logistical 
obstacles associated with obtaining such certificates were practically insurmountable for the 
overwhelming majority of FDPs.   
 
Box 3 below summarizes positions of the government, the Crimean Tatars, and IOs on the 
remaining issue—the requirement to obtain a proof of release from previous citizenship.  In 
particular, it shows different actors’ opinions as to whether Ukraine could solve the issue itself (by 
changing legislation or interpreting existing legislative provisions in a way that would allow 
Crimean Tatar FDPs to apply for Ukrainian citize ship without obtaining documents from other 
countries where they were de jure citizens), without depending on other CIS countries changing 
their procedures for release from citizenship.  The darkly shaded area shows the policy that was 
adopted, while lightly shaded areas show where interests of different groups diverged. 
 
Box 3 – Preferences of Actors on How to Resolve Release from Previous Citizenship Issue 
Actor 
Policy issue: Can Ukraine resolve the requirement that release 
from previous citizenship be documented by changing its own 
legislation or by interpreting existing legal provisions differently? 
Ukrainian government, in particular Citizenship 
Department of the Presidential Administration 
 
No 
 
Crimean Tatars represented by Mejlis 
 
Yes 
 
UNHCR 
 
Yes, by interpreting existing legal provisions differently 
 
OSCE 
 
Yes, by means of introducing a government order
 
Council of Europe 
 
Yes, by interpreting existing legal provisions differently 
 
As this box illustrates, the Crimean Tatars wanted the Ukrainian government to remove the 
requirement for proof of release from previous citizenship—not because they were opposed to the 
single citizenship principle, their leaders argued, but because the principle, as implemented in the 
law, had a particularly dverse effect on them, de facto barring them from obtaining Ukrainian 
citizenship.  The solution proposed by the Crimean Tatars was to introduce a provision in the 
citizenship law allowing for the clause of Article 2 (3) “not being citizens of other states” not o 
be applied when an FDP submits a declaration on his/her willingness to be a citizen of Ukraine 
and not citizen of the state of his or her current citizenship.  The proposal to have the issue 
resolved by submission of individual declarations renouncing prior citizenship was an option 
proposed not only by the Crimean Tatars, but by some of the IOs as well.   
 
                                                                                                                                                     
ethnically, based.  Emphasizing one’s origin from the territory of Ukraine rather than one’s Ukrainian ethnicity 
made the provision more neutral and more inclusive, since it applied to groups such as Crimean Tatars who were 
not of Ukrainian ethnic origin, but had links to Ukrainian territory. 
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In a February 1997 letter to the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities suggested that all Crimean Tatars  
be granted citizenship of Ukraine provided that they submit an application 
requesting this accompanied by a formal declaration of renunciation of the 
citizenship of the country from which they had returned to Crimea….In order to 
respect interests of the states from which Crimean Tatars falling under such an 
arrangement have returned, a list of those who have renounced their citizenship 
could be dispatched to the Government concerned.  In this connection, I also note 
that no state can forbid a person to change his citizenship….It would even be 
contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] 
to make the acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship dependent upon the determination 
of another state to agree to and to facilitate renunciation.32 
In his letter of response, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister promised that the OSCE proposal “will be 
thoroughly considered by our experts and taken into account,” but this proposal was eventually 
not supported, as one can see from the provisions of the law finally adopted in April 1997.   
 
The Ukrainian authorities’ stance was that with the passage of the new citizenship law, Ukraine 
had done everything in its power to facilitate as much as possible FDPs’ access to citizenship.  If 
the US$100 fee charged by the Uzbek side for the certificate of release was a problem, it was not 
up to Ukraine to solve this issue.  Allowing acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship on the basis of a 
declaration renouncing prior citizenship would lead to cases of de jure dual citizenship, since 
legally the Ukrainian state cannot make decisions on termination of Uzbek citizenship, and 
therefore these proposals were deemed unacceptable by the government.   
 
After the 1997 citizenship law was adopted, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe made several 
suggestions to the government on how the dilemma of FDPs with foreign citizenship in Ukraine 
could be solved and the principle of single citizenship upheld.  One proposal was to adopt an 
interpretation of the clause in Article 34 (5) (that did not demand a document on release from 
previous citizenship in cases when a person is unable to receive such a document “for good 
reasons despite one’s control”) whereby lack of funds to pay for the release document would be 
interpreted as a good reason beyond a person’s control.  Such an interpretation of Article 34 (5) 
could have given access to Ukrainian citizenship to those FDPs who were citizens of Uzbekistan 
and could not afford to pay the $100 fee set by the Uzbek side for release from citizenship, while 
upholding the principle of single citizenship.  The Ukrainian side did not agree to such an 
interpretation, however, being unconvinced that inability to pay the fee could be deemed a “good 
reason beyond one’s control.”33  
 
The position of the Ukrainian authorities on the dilemma of avoiding cases of dual citizenship and 
not requiring FDP applicants to present a proof of release from previous citizenship was that this 
                                                  
32 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, “Letter to Hennady Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine, and the letter of reply,” Prague OSCE Documentation Center reference and number REF.HC/4/97, (14 
February 1997). Available from http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/recomm/ukraine/1997/44hc47.html. 
33 Interpretations of the clause on what shall and shall not be considered good reasons beyond one’s control are 
reflected in Appendix 9 of the March 1998 Ministry of Interior Order on processing applications related to 
citizenship of Ukraine. Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Instruktsia pro poriadok pryiniattia, rozhliadu ta 
prokhodzhennia v organakh vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrainy klopotan, zaiav, inshykh documentiv z pytan 
hromadianstva Ukrainy. 
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could be solved by way of bi- r multi-lateral agreements with CIS states where thes  FDPs were 
de jure citizens.  This solution was favored by Ukraine, as the Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister 
argued, because no unilateral legal acts can foresee all possible changes in the laws of another 
country, and thus cannot guarantee against the emergence of cases of dual citizenship in the 
future.34   
 
Bilateral agreements (the first one was between Ukraine and Uzbekistan) were how this last 
outstanding aspect of citizenship was resolved in the end.  The agreement was officially 
announced in August 1998 after several rounds of negotiations between Ukrainian and Uzbek 
authorities and meetings of the Ukrainian and Uzbek presidents.  Under this agreement, a 
mechanism was established whereby FDPs wishing to be released from Uzbek citizenship can 
submit an application to local bodies of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior, which are to collect 
such applications and pass them to the Uzbek authorities, who within six months are to inform the 
Ukrainian side on the applications submitted.35  Fees for submission of such applications were 
waived by the Uzbek side, and the agreement was in force until the end of 1999.
 
2.  IOs’ Effect on Legislative Change 
 
This section analyzes the effect IOs had at different stages and with regard to different aspects of 
the Ukrainian citizenship legislation amended in 1997 and 1998, as well as the role they played in 
influencing practical implementation of the citizenship policy. 
 
The UNHCR and other IOs became actively involved with the FDP citizenship problem in 
Ukraine at approximately the same time as governmental working groups began drafting 
amendments to the citizenship law.  The UNHCR provided recommendations to the law drafters, 
and many of these were incorporated in the law.  Specifically, the UNHCR served as a source of  
international expertise, providing the Ukrainian government information about international legal 
standards on citizenship.  It funded translations of international legal documents into Ukrainian for 
use by the experts in the Citizenship Department of Presidential Administration and other 
domestic experts, and also funded travel to international seminars and conferences by Ukrainian 
officials.  The first such trip took place in December 1996, when the draft citizenship law was 
under discussion in the parliament, and the UNHCR funded a trip to Geneva by several members 
of the sub-committee as well as representatives of the Presidential Administration.  During this 
trip, Ukrainian representatives approached the Council of Europe and the UNHCR, requesting 
them to conduct expert analysis of the new Ukrainian citizenship legislation and its compliance 
with international legal standards.   
 
Such developments must have made the draft Ukrainian law closer to international standards, of 
which there was limited knowledge in Ukraine before the involvement of IOs, not the least 
because citizenship itself was a new concept for Ukraine, having become an independent state 
only in 1991.  There was little domestic expertise, and few international materials and legal texts 
                                                  
34 Khandogii, “Dvostoronni uhody, scho spriamovani na vyrishennia pytan’ hrom dianstva,” 19. 
35 The Ukrainian-Uzbek agreement and the administrative decrees detailing the mechanism of its realization are 
published in Viktor Andrienko, ed., Domovlennist mizh Ukrainoiu ta Respublikoiu Uzbekistan schchodo 
spivrobitnytstva u vyrishenni pytan hromadianstva deportovannykh osib ta yikhnikh nashchadkiv (Kiev: UNHCR, 
1999): 176-202. 
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were available in Ukrainian.  This demonstrates the particular importance of expert functions 
performed by IOs in countries with limited experience and expertise in a given area.  
 
However, the evidence discussed in the previous section also demonstrate  that,  he question 
of proof of release from prior citizenship, UNHCR and other IOs have not been able to influence 
the policy preferences of the Ukrainian government.  The issue was highly contested domestically 
and had implications directly bearing on what was defined by the government as a matter of 
“national interest”—not allowing for de facto r de jure dual citizenship to emerge.  However, 
with the conclusion of the bilateral Ukrainian-Uzbek agreement, policies were changed eventually, 
with the final outcome acceptable to and welcomed by IOs.  What does this course of events tell 
us about the role IOs played?  
 
First, it allows us to conclude that international pressure is less effective on policy issues that are 
highly politicized, and linked to issues of high political importance for the governments involved.  
The definition of single citizenship as a matter of “national interest” and the requirement to obtain 
proof of release from prior citizenship stemming from this principle, can be attributed to the 
Ukrainian government’s insistence on this requirement and rejection of IOs’ recommendations 
that, in the view of the government, could have compromised this principle.   
 
Second, the fact that the UNHCR and other IOs have nevertheless persisted in their coop ration 
with the Ukrainian authorities in search of an acceptable compromise, which was eventually 
concluded, shows that flexibility when setting policy objectives was an effective strategy on the 
part of the IOs.  The Ukrainian government insist d that only by means of bilateral agreements 
with other relevant states could a solution to the release requirement be found, and the UNHCR, 
instead of criticizing the Ukrainian authorities for not accepting the solution it proposed, instead 
chose to assi t the Ukrainian authorities in concluding such agreements with Uzbekistan and other 
CIS countries. 
 
When Ukraine and Uzbekistan engaged in negotiations exploring the possibility of such an 
agreement, the UNHCR offered its “good offices” for the two sides during negotiations, but 
apparently due to the reluctance of the Uzbek side to  “internationalize” the issue, negotiations 
remained bilateral.  The UNHCR, although not involved in the negotiations process, followed it 
closely and took actions to inform both sides of its position, as did other IOs.  In December 1997 
both UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata and OSCE High Commissioner on National 
minorities Max van der Stoel addressed letters to the Uzbek Foreign Minister requesting that his 
government simplify citizenship renunciation procedures for Crimean Tatars who had relocated to 
Crimea from Uzbekistan.  The UNHCR has also financed missions of Ukrainian experts who 
traveled to Uzbekistan to negotiate with their Uzbek counterparts, and later financed simi r t ips 
to other CIS countries where a number of FDPs living in Ukraine still had citizenship.   
 
Third, even though on the issue of release from previous citizenship IOs have not succeeded in 
having the Ukrainian government accept their initial proposals, it can be said that the IOs have 
nevertheless had an effect by way of “closing” certain policy alternatives for the government.  The 
UNHCR has shown flexibility when some of its policy recommendations have been rejected, and, 
not being directly involved in the Ukrainian-Uzbek negotiations process, did not make specific 
recommendations on what solution the two countries should adopt.  However, the UNHCR and 
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other involved IOs made it clear what outcomes were not acceptable.  Most notably, they made it 
clear to the Ukrainian government that a situation whereby applicants had to pay a US$100 fee 
and had to travel from Crimea to the Uzbek embassy in Kiev was not acceptable, since it de facto 
prevented FDP applicants from being able to apply for citizenship at all, and that therefore 
changes were necessary.  How the issue was to be resolved otherwise and what procedures were 
to be applied were left to the competence of the two governments involved.   
 
3.  IOs’ Effect on Interpretation of Legal Provisions and Implementation of New Regulations  
 
Although changes in the law are a very important element of any overall policy changes, changing 
the letter of the law is not sufficient to bring about results desired in practical terms, especially in a 
country where the rule of law is only being developed, and policy changes on paper do not 
automatically translate into policy changes in practice.  Therefore, this section will analyze IOs’ 
impact on the interpretation of existing legal provisions by the Ukrainian authorities, and on the 
practical implementation of new citizenship policies.  The evidence that will be laid out below 
suggests that IOs have been most influential in this realm, and this influence has been a critical 
factor that has allowed statelessness in Ukraine to be eliminated, and the overall number of non-
citizens among FDPs to be substantially reduced.   
 
· Effect on interpretation 
 
With regard to policy interpretation, there have been many instances when the UNHCR has 
identified and successfully lobbied the authorities to change interpretations of various laws and 
government orders in a manner that would be more advantageous to FDPs applying for Ukrainian 
citizenship.  One example was the simplified citizenship affiliation procedure established in the 
1997 citizenship law applied to those who could document their or their ancestor’s origin in 
Ukraine.  The law did not specify what documents would be considered as acceptable proofs of 
origin, which was left to be specified in government interpretations.  The March 1998 instruction 
of the Ministry of Interior on processing citizenship applications excluded the passport as a 
document certifying an applicant’s place of birth.  Instead, a birth certificate or archival 
documents were to be provided.  This provision, if implemented, would have had a significantly 
adverse effect on descendants of FDPs who needed to document that their parents or 
grandparents had been born in Crimea, since archival records in Crimea have been incomplete, 
missing, or otherwise difficult to obtain.  The UNHCR took up this issue with the Ministry of 
Interior, and was successful.  Although the instruction itself has not been changed, the Ministry 
issued orders to local authorities in Crimea to continue accepting passports as a proof of origin 
from Ukraine.  Several months later, the UNHCR successfully advocated for an even more 
simplified procedure whereby local migration services in Crimea began issuing a standard form 
confirming applicants’ FDP status, and thus origin from Ukraine.   
 
Among other examples of UNHCR’s successful direct impact on how legal provisions were 
interpreted was the waiving of all fees related to the citizenship affiliation procedure by the 
Ukrainian authorities.  The Ukrainian authorities also followed UNHCR recommendations to 
establish a procedure whereby an administrative conclusion stating the individual’s eligibility for 
Ukrainian citizenship is drafted before the renunciation application is forwarded to the Uzbek 
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authorities in order to avoid cases of interim statelessness in the period between one’s release 
from Uzbek and affiliation to Ukrainian citizenship.   
 
· Effect on implementation 
 
With regard to practical implementation of the new, simplified citizenship procedures established 
in the 1997 and 1998 legal acts, the UNHCR has been instrumental in making the spirit and the 
letter of the law a reality, and can undoubtedly take credit for the fact that tens of thousands of 
FDPs in Crimea now hold Ukrainian passports.  Figures 4 and 6 in the Appendices illustrate that 
since mid-1997 thousands of FDPs and their descendants have received Ukrainian passports, in 
comparison with less than 300 in years prior to 1997.  UNHCR’s impact on citizenship policy 
implementation has been many-fold, and several successful strategies can be identified.   
 
First, on-the-ground monitoring through its field office, local NGO counterparts, and a 
consultancy project enabled the UNHCR to identify incorrect interpretations or applications of the 
legislation by officials at the local level, which in turn permitted timely interventions by UNHCR 
with central authorities and by those authorities with local officials to correct local policies.  By 
monitoring activities of authorities at the local level, the UNHCR has been acting as a “fire 
alarm,” identifying sub-standard practices and alerting central government authorities about it.  
For example, the UNHCR has identified that, in contradiction to the citizenship law, authorities in 
Crimea often refused to accept citizenship applications from those FDPs w o lived in substandard 
housing and did not have an official propiska36 registration.  According to the law, citizenship 
applications are to be accepted by relevant Ministry of Interior bodies at places of applicants’ 
residence.  Some OVIRs (Departments of Visas and Registrations, the Ministry of Interior bodies 
charged with processing applications), interpreting residence as propiska, had refused to accept 
applications from people who did not have a propisk, for example those living in dormitories.  
The UNHCR brought this to the attention of the central authorities, which led to the central 
authority instructing local offices on the proper interpretation of the law.   
 
Second, monitoring at the micro-level also enabled the UNHCR to identify precise ne ds of local 
government offices on which successful policy implementation depended, and thus to plan 
targeted assistance.  For example, anticipating a sharp increase in the rate of applications for 
citizenship after the Ukrainian-Uzbek agreement was signed in August 1998, and being aware that 
organs accepting and processing applications might not have sufficient capacity to process all new 
applications (the rate of applications was expected to sky-rocke  from several dozen a year to 
600-1,000 a month), the UNHCR offered to finance the creation of additional positions at the 
Crimean OVIRs, and also provided substantial material assistance such as office equipment, filing 
cabinets, and cars to enable staff to travel to remote settlements to collect applications.  
 
Scholars of international institutions have pointed out that “one of the most fundamental ways in 
which international institutions can change state behavior is by substituting for domestic 
                                                  
36 The propiska is a stamp in one’s internal passport that is placed by the authorities and which specifies where the 
person legally resides and is registered.  It is in turn related to where one can get social assistance, go to school,  
etc. 
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practices.”37 This has indeed been the case with the UNHCR in Ukraine, which has often been 
fulfilling functions traditionally performed by state institutions, and even contributing to state-
building.  The UNHCR has monitored implementation of national legislation by local authorities, 
financed and produced instructions, forms, and texts of the laws and by-laws, and planned and 
implemented a massive awareness campaign in the media to alert FDPs in Crimea about changes 
in citizenship procedures and the importance of becoming Ukrainian citizens.   
 
All of these functions are traditionally performed by the state rather than a foreign institution.  
UNHCR’s awareness campaign aimed at raising the consciousness of FDPs about the importance 
of citizenship can furthermore be regarded as a de facto state-building measure.  With citizenship 
being a new concept for residents of the post-Soviet states, the importance of citizenship has been 
commonly underestimated, and the whole concept ill understood.  As sociological research has 
revealed, many FDPs were not even aware that they were not Ukrainian citizens, wrongly 
believing that residency and citizenship were the same.  By launching a massive awareness 
campaign in the media and through NGO counterparts, the UNHCR assisted in raising civic 
consciousness and “creating” many thousands f Ukrainian citizens. 
 
Faced with all this evidence one may wonder why the Ukrainian government was so receptive to 
these activities of IOs? Why did it allow them to take on many functions traditionally performed 
by domestic actors and institutions? Why have the authorities often proved to be willing to re-
consider their policies on issues such as implementation of existing laws and interpretation of 
provisions of the law and by-laws? As one scholar put it in a recent article on the effect of 
supranational experts, “why should governments, with millions of diverse and highly trained 
professional employees, massive information-gatheri g capacity, and long-sta ding experience 
with international negotiations at their disposal, ever require the services of a handful of 
supranational entrepreneurs to generate and disseminate useful information and ideas?”38   
 
This may be a puzzle with regard to countries where governments indeed have a wealth of 
information, resources, and trained employees at their disposal, as well as long-standing 
experience and expertise with policies that IOs seek to influence.  In the case of Ukraine, 
however, the government does not have any of these advantages: economic crises have severely 
limited government’s material capacity, and such a trivial issue as the purchase of filing cabinets to 
store files of citizenship applicants is an insurmountable obstacle to many of the local OVIR 
departments.  The whole issue of citizenship is novel for Ukraine which became an independent 
state less than a decade ago.  As a result, the specialized bureaucracy does not have accumulated 
expertise or the benefit of prior experience.   
 
Under these conditions, the government had much to gain from information and resources offered 
by the IOs without which, even if there was a will to have new laws implemented, it might not 
have been possible because of material, informational, and coordination constraints.  The material 
and technical assistance IOs can offer are likely to be incentives in any setting, but they are 
particularly powerful incentives in an environment of economic crisis where state resources are 
                                                  
37 Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theoretical and Empirical Studies of International Institutions” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 747-48. 
38 Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft. Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation” 
International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 273. 
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severely limited.  It can be mentioned that as a result of UNHCR’s material assistance, the 
Citizenship Department has become the only department in the Pr sidential Administration fully 
fitted with computers and office equipment.   
 
However, as this paper has demonstrated, when the issues in question are highly politicized and 
divisive domestically, the material and other incentives that IOs can offer to bring about policy 
changes usually do not outweigh considerations stemming from concerns about possible negative 
domestic political consequences.   
 
 
V.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Evidence presented in this paper illustrates that the UNHCR and other international organizations 
had a significant effect on different aspects of Ukrainian citizenship policy, and that, most likely, 
without their involvement the FDPs’ citizenship and statelessness problems would not have been 
solved.  More specifically, evidence from the Ukrainian case supports the argument that the IOs 
have been most effective in influencing the interpretation and implementation of existing legal 
provisions, rather than policy formation.  Furthermore, with regard to policy formati n, IOs’
effectiveness appears to be determined by the level of politicization of the given policy issue, with 
IOs’ influence being weakest on more politicized questions.  Analysts and policy makers 
interested in international influences on transition cou tries can draw several lessons from the case 
analyzed in this project. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
IOs should pursue a flexible, step-by-step strategy and periodically make adjustments to policy 
aims. 
 
As demonstrated by this research, the eventual solution of FDP citizenship problems in Ukraine 
was not a smooth process, but rather one of slow adjustments by all the parties involved in 
relation to their “ideal” policy preferences, and moves toward each other in search of a 
compromise acceptable to all.  This relates not only to the Ukrainian government and Crimean 
Tatar leaders, but also to the IOs, which had to be able to respond to the situation when many of 
their proposals and recommendations were not initially accepted.  The decision of the UNHCR to 
adjust its aims in such a way that the desirable practical outcome would still be eventually 
achieved by designing different ways to achieve it was an important and effective strategy.   
 
Such an approach also turned a potential “winner/loser” situation into an “all winners” one.  
Interestingly enough, different Ukrainian actors are now quick to argue that it was thanks to them 
that the FDP citizenship problem in Ukraine was finally solved: Crimean Tatar leaders emphasize 
the importance of their protest actions nd government lobbying efforts, government officials 
credit their good will and legal skills in drafting successful policy proposals, and Members of 
Parliament from specialized subcommittees also claim credit for their attention to the problem and 
initiation of legal amendments.  The UNHCR, emphasizing its own role, does not forget to 
express appreciation for the Ukrainian government’s good will, while the authorities express their 
appreciation of the UNHCR’s material and expert assistance.  Pursuit of a step-by-step policy and 
  
26
adjustments of specific policy objectives on the part of IOs have enabled all parties involved, 
including domestic actors, who used to hold very different views on the nature of the problem and 
possible solutions, to reach a compromise.  The compromise, perhaps sub-optimal from each 
party’s initial “ideal point,” has nevertheless proved acceptable to all.  In this regard, another, 
related, lesson can be drawn: 
 
In the transition environment, the success or failure of IOs’ policies are not final, but can 
change rapidly.  Policy decisions are more often a product of short-term political considerations 
than well-established institutional procedures and rules. 
 
This reality sets transition countries apart from established democracies, and ne essitates 
adjustment of the approaches and strategies IOs adopt when seeking to influence domestic 
policies.  As illustrated in this paper, informal contacts and information exchanges at settings such 
as seminars, round-tables, and so forth, are often more effective than such “traditional” lobbying 
methods as formal letter writing and regular periodic meetings.  In a transition environment with 
unstable formal rules, informal rules and practices are of equal if not greater importance than 
formal ones.  The IO’s ability to understand and successfully navigate the world of informal 
policy-making rules and influence networks can make them very effective players.  However, 
informal rules and policy-making mechanisms are not as stable as formal rules, and polici  may 
be reversed more easily for short-term political considerations—a reality that can have both 
negative and positive consequences for IOs.  This leads to another potential lesson: 
 
Micro-level monitoring and situation assessment are important in allowing IOs to formulate 
timely and effective policy aims, and to create effective strategies responsive to micro- and 
macro-level needs. 
 
A key factor accounting for the overall success of the UNHCR’s activities in Ukraine analyzed in 
this paper has been th  UNHCR’s consistent involvement at a micro-level, which has enabled the 
organization to identify policies that have been sub-optimal or turned out to have a sub-optimal 
effect in practice, and therefore to formulate objectives that were well-informed in terms of 
current local needs, and effective and feasible ways of bringing about desired changes.  The 
importance of micro-level presence and monitoring—a critical factor contributing to the 
UNHCR’s overall success in the sphere of Ukrainian citizenship polcy—has larger implications 
for the effectiveness of external influences generally.  An organization or another foreign actor 
operating in a different manner, that is, without a permanent local presence that permits 
monitoring the situation as it changes, asses ing current needs and challenges, and formulating 
policies accordingly, may not be as effective as the UNHCR in Ukraine has been.  Furthermore, 
local presence is also an effective way to monitor how material assistance is being used, and thus 
to minimize the danger of its misuse—a problem many international donors face.   
  
Table 1: Provisions of 1991 and 1997 editions of the Ukrainian citizenship law related to FDPs.  
 
 
1991 law with 1993 amendments, in 
force until May 1997 39 
New edition of the law as proposed 
by the working group and approved 
during the 1st reading on 30 
October 199640 
New edition of the citizenship law 
as passed by the Parliament on 14 
April 1997, in force since 20 May 
199741 
Article 2: Affiliation to the 
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Citizens of Ukraine are: 
… 
(2) persons who work abroad on 
recommendation of the state, serve in 
the armed forces, or study abroad, or 
who left legally for permanent 
residency abroad, if they were born in 
Ukraine or prove that they have 
permanently resided in Ukraine before 
they left, are not citizens of other 
states, and have expressed their 
desire to become citizens of Ukraine 
no later than five years from the date 
of entry of this law into force. 
Article 2: Affiliation to the 
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Citizens of Ukraine are: 
…. 
(2) persons who left Ukraine if they 
are not citizens of other states, were 
born or have resided permanently on 
a territory that was part of Ukraine as 
of the day when Declaration of 
Independence was adopted (24 Aug 
91), as well as members of their 
family (children, grandchildren, 
husband, wife) who have, no later 
than 31 December 1996, expressed 
desire to become Ukrainian citizens. 
Article 2: Affiliation to the 
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Citizens of Ukraine are: 
… 
(3) persons who were born or resided 
permanently on the territory of 
Ukraine, as well as their descendants 
(children, grandchildren), if they 
resided beyond the borders of 
Ukraine on 13 November 1991, do 
not hold citizenship of other states, 
and before 31 December 1999 
submitted an application on 
determining their affiliation to the 
citizenship of Ukraine by procedure 
established in the present law. 
Article 17: Admission to the  
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Conditions for acquiring Ukrainian 
citizenship are: 
(1) renunciation of foreign citizenship; 
(2) permanent residence on the 
territory of Ukraine over the last five 
years. 
Article 17: Admission to the  
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Conditions for acquiring Ukrainian 
citizenship are: 
(1) renunciation of foreign citizenship; 
(2) permanent residence on the 
territory of Ukraine over the last five 
years. 
Article 16:43 Admission to the  
citizenship of Ukraine. 
Conditions for acquiring Ukrainian 
citizenship are: 
(1) recognition of and compliance 
with the Constitution and laws of 
Ukraine; 
(2) not holding foreign citizenship; 
                                                  
39 As initially adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 8 October 1991 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1991), and amended on 28 
January 1993 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1993), on 14 July 1994 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 
1994), and on 14 October 1994 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1994).  
40 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, Komisia z pytan prav liudyny, natsionalnykh menshyni mizhnatsionalnykh vidnosyn, 1997. 
“Porivnialna tablytsia do proektu zakonu Ukrainy ‘Pro vnesennia zmin i dopovnen do zakonu Ukrainy’ Pro hromadianstvo 
Ukrainy.”  Document No. 509 (20 January 1997). 
41 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1997. “Zakon Ukrainy ‘Pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy’.” Document No. 210-97BP (16 April 
1997). Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 1997, No. 23, p. 169.
42 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1993. “Zakon pro vensennia zmin i dopovnen do Zakonu Ukrainy ‘Pro hromadianstvo’.” 
Document No. 2949-XII (28 January 1993). Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrain , 1993, No. 14, p. 121.
  
This rule does not apply to persons 
who arrived in Ukraine for permanent 
residence and expressed a desire to 
become Ukrainian citizens provided 
that they were born or prove that at 
least one of their parents, grandfather, 
or grandmother was born on its 
territory and are not citizens of other 
states;42 
(3) knowledge of Ukrainian language 
within the extent sufficient for 
communication; 
(4) availability of legal sources of 
income; 
(5) recognition of and compliance with 
the Constitution of Ukraine. 
 
This rule does not apply to persons 
who expressed a desire to become 
Ukrainian citizens provided that they 
were born or prove that at least one of 
their parents, grandfather, or 
grandmother was born on its terri o y 
and are not citizens of other states. 
(3) knowledge of Ukrainian language 
within the extent sufficient for 
communication; 
(4) availability of legal sources of 
income 
… 
Upon expiration of the term set 
forth in Article 2 (2) of this law, 
victims of repression, including 
those deported from the territory of 
Ukraine, can receive citizenship by 
procedure established under Article 
16, excluding requirements set 
forth in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
 
(3) continuous residence on legal 
grounds on the territory of Ukraine 
over the last five years. 
This rule does not apply to persons 
who expressed a desire to become 
Ukrainian citizens provided that they 
were born or prove that at least one 
of their parents, grandfather, or 
grandmother was born on its 
territory. 
(4) knowledge of Ukrainian language 
within the extent sufficient for 
communication; 
(5) availability of legal sources of 
income 
… 
Upon expiration of the term set forth 
in Article 2 (3) of this law, people 
covered by this provision can receive 
Ukrainian citizenship by procedure 
established under Article 16, 
excluding requirements set forth in 
paragraphs 3 and 4.
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
43 Numbering of articles changed since draft Article 10 on honorary citizenship was dropped. 
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